

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06048 01 OF 02 062038Z

73

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /089 W

----- 032311

P R 061815Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4456

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6048

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: WORKING GROUP STUDY OF SUB-CEILING ARRANGEMENTS  
AND FLEXIBILITY

REF: USNATO 5985 041850Z NOV 75

1. THERE FOLLOWS FIRST REVISION OF DRAFT TEXT OF MBFR WORKING  
GROUP STUDY OF LIMITED FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES FOR US AND SOVIET  
FORCES FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND FOR "NO INCREASE"  
COMMITMENT BETWEEN PHASES (REFTEL. WG WILL CONSIDER THIS  
DRAFT NOVEMBER 11.

ACTION: REQUEST: REQUEST GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR NOV 11 WG SESSION.

2. BEGIN TEXT

1. IN THEIR MEETING OF 27 OCTOBER THE SENIOR POLITICAL  
COMMITTEE INVITED(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO CONSIDER FROM THE  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06048 01 OF 02 062038Z

MILITARY AND TECHNICAL POINTS OF VIEW, WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT,  
THE ALLIANCE MIGHT REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN  
GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE CASES OF:

A. THE GROUND FORCE SUB-CEILINGS IMPOSED ON US AND

USSR FORCES AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS: AND  
B. THE LIMITATIONS ON AGGREGATE ALLIED AND WARSAW PACT  
GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER RESPECTIVELY ARISING FROM "NO  
INCREASE" COMMITMENTS BETWEEN PHASES.  
THE WORKING GROUP SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EFFECTS OF  
APPLYING SUCH ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY, RECIPROCALLY, TO THE WARSAW  
PACT.

2. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS QUOTED  
ABOVE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SOME POSSIBLE EFFECTS FOR AN MBFR  
POST-PHASE II SITUATION.

3. IN A PREVIOUS REPORT(2) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP STUDIED  
THE DESIRABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARRANGING CEILINGS OR  
SUB-CEILINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW SOME LIMITED FREEDOM FOR  
NATO, POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR  
FORCES AND THUS RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE THEIR FORCES.

FOOTNOTES:

- (1) SPC(OT)R/27, 30 OCT 75
- (2) AC/276-D(75)7, 8 SEP 75

IN ESSENCE THE WORKING GROUP FOUND THAT, OVERALL, THERE COULD BE  
ADVANTAGE FOR NATO TO NEGOTIATE A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE POST-  
PHASE II (FREEDOM TO TRANSFER PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES

IN THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN. THIS NUMBER SHOULD MEET POSSIBLE NATO  
FLEXIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS:  
AND RECIPROCAL APPLICATION BY THE WP WOULD BE MILITARILY TOLERABLE.

US AND USSR POST PHASE I REDUCTIONS

4. THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR(1) PROVIDES  
(IN PARA 36) THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE OF MBFR THE OVERALL  
COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING SHOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE WITH NO  
NATIONAL SUB-CEILING OTHER THAN ON THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES  
WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIANCE APPROACH(1) ALSO REQUIRES  
THE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS OF US AND USSR GROUND FORCES ONLY IN  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06048 01 OF 02 062038Z

PHASE I. CEILINGS ON US AND USSR GROUND PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF  
REDUCTIONS, WHETHER OR NOT EXPRESSED NUMERICALLY, WOULD BE APPLIED.

5. THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE INDICATED THAT, POST-PHASE I  
REDUCTION, THEY WOULD FAVOUR AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED LIMITED  
FREEDOM TO TRANSFER (A MAXIMUM OF 5,000) PERSONNEL BETWEEN US GROUND  
AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT  
WOULD GIVE THE US FLEXIBILITY TO MAKE MINOR VARIATIONS IN SERVICE  
MANNING TO ADJUST TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEW EQUIPMENT, DEPLOYMENT  
PATTERNS OR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

6. THE WORKING GROUP'S PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THIS SUBJECT DID NOT  
ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING IN PHASE I A FLEXIBILITY

ALLOWANCE FOR US/USSR FORCES, TO BECOME EFFECTIVE AFTER REDUCTIONS  
AGREED IN THAT PHASE.

7. IN GENERAL TERMS, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT THE  
ADVANTAGES OF A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, CITED IN THEIR PREVIOUS REPORT  
(1), WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO A LIMITED FREEDOM FOR US AND USSR  
TO TRANSFER MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES POST-PHASE I  
REDUCTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE FLEXIBILITY  
ALLOWANCE FOR US FORCES SHOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06048 02 OF 02 062050Z

73

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /089 W

----- 032467

P R 061815Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4457

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6048

8. THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE OF 5,000, FOR US FORCES POST-PHASE I,  
SHOULD BE A PART OF THE TOTAL OF 20,000 WHICH, THE WORKING GROUP  
BELIEVE(1) COULD POSSIBLY MEET CURRENT AND FUTURE ALLIED RESTRUCTUR-  
ING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, ENSURE THAT THE ALLIED  
OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE  
AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS MAINTAINED.

9. ALLIED PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR  
US FORCES ON THIS SCALE WOULD, NOT, EITHER BY ITS FORM OR ITS SCALE,  
ERODE THE IMPACT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS. THE REDUCTIONS

FOOTNOTE:

(1) AC/276-D(75)7, 8 SEP 75

WOULD BE AGREED AND TAKE EFFECT BEFORE THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE  
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06048 02 OF 02 062050Z

BECAME EFFECTIVE: FURTHERMORE, INCREASE OF US/USSR GROUND MANPOWER  
UNDER THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, COULD ONLY BE AT THE EXPENSE OF US/  
USSR AIR MANPOWER.

10. WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF THIS ARRANGEMENT TO THE  
USSR, THE POINT COULD BE MADE THAT SINCE USSR MANPOWER FORCES IN THE  
AREA ARE GREATER THAN THE US FORCES, THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR THE

USSR SHOULD BE MORE THAN THAT ACCORDED TO THE US. ON THIS ISSUE,  
FFROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW:

- A. THE USSR ALLOWANCE MUST BE CONTAINED WITHIN A MAXIMUM OF  
20,000 (SEE PARA 8) FOR ALL WP FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.
- B. IF THE USSR TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS ALLOWANCE TO REPLACE GROUND  
FORCE PERSONNEL, IT WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF A LIKE REDUCTION OF  
SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER.
- C. THE USSR IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MUCH OF A FLEXIBILITY  
ALLOWANCE BETWEEN PHASE I AND COMPLETION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS.  
UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH SUCH ACTION WOULD EXPOSE THEM TO HIGHER  
GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM "NO-INCREASE" COMMITMENTS

11. THE WORKING GROUP HAS ALSO CONSIDERED, AS REQUESTED,  
WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THE ALLIANCE MIGHT REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY  
FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES BETWEEN PHASES I AND II  
OF MBFR, IN THE EVENT THAT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON AGGREGATE ALLIED  
AND WARSAW PACT STRENGTH ARISING FROM "NON-INCREASE" COMMITMENTS  
BETWEEN PHASES.

12. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED(1) THE  
REQUIREMENT AND APPROPRIATE SCALE OF A SIMILAR AGGREGATE FLEXIBILITY  
ALLOWANCE, TO BE APPLIED POST-PHASE II, WHEN REDUCTIONS AGREED IN  
BOTH PHASE I AND PHASE II HAD TAKEN PLACE. IN PRINCIPLE, THE  
ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN THAT CONTEXT COULD APPLY EQUALLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES,

POST-PHASE I, IN WHICH EXPLICIT NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS WER APPLIED  
TO AGGREGATE NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES  
SEPARATELY.

13. IN SHORT, IN THOSE CONDITIONS OF LIMITATIONS OF ALLIED  
MANPOWER, IF THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES IS LIKELY TO BE OF SUB-  
STANTIAL DURATION, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO ESTABLISH AND RETAIN  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06048 02 OF 02 062050Z

THE FREEDOM TO  
MAKE LIMITED TRANSFERS OF MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER,  
TO MEET POSSIBLE (NOT PROGRAMMED) RESTRUCTURING.

14. IF A FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WERE TO BE APPLIED BETWEEN PHASES TO ALL ALLIED FORCES, THE SCALE OF THE ALLOWANCE SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE SAME BASIS AS THAT DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP'S PREVIOUS REPORT (AC/276-D(75)7), I.E. IT SHOULD BE 20,000 TO PERMIT RESTRUCTURING: AND SHOULD NOT EXCEED 20,000.

15. WITHIN THAT 20,000, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO ALOT A SPECIFIED ALLOWANCE TO THE US AND USSR SINCE, LACKING SUCH SPECIFICITY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USSR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WHOLE OF THE ALLOWANCE TO REINSTATE USSR GROUND MANPOWER UP TO 20,000 BY TRANSFER OF USSR OR NON-USSR AIRMEN. THE SCALE OF FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES APPROPRIATE TO US AND USSR IS DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS PAPER.

FOOTNOTE: AC/276-D(75)7

16. HOWEVER, FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES FOR THE WHOLE OF THE ALLIED GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE ORDER OF 20,000 MEN PROPOSED IN PHASE I IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS OF US AND USSR FORCES ONLY, COULD SERIOUSLY ERODE THE ALLIED CONCEPT FOR PHASE I REDUCTIONS. IN THEORY, THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE WOULD ALLOW THE ALLIES AND THE PACT TO REPLACE 20,000 OF THEIR GROUND MANPOWER WITHDRAWN (29,000 US AND 68,000 SOVIET RESPECTIVELY) ALBEIT AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR MANPOWER.

17. HOWEVER, UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRING PHASED REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING (ABOUT 700,000) FOR GROUND FORCES, INCREASES IN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN PHASES WOULD RESULT IN GREATER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II TO REACH THE PRESCRIBED COMMON CEILING. ALSO THIS FREEDOM IN PRACTICE WOULD BE CONSTRAINED FOR BOTH SIDES, BY THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THEIR AIR FORCES AT A LEVEL SUFFICIENT TO MEET COMMITMENTS.

18. IF THE PERIOD IN BETWEEN PHASES WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL  
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06048 02 OF 02 062050Z

DURATION AND IF A "NON INCREASE" COMMITMENT WERE APPLIED TO AGGREGATE NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCES SEPARATELY, IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO ESTABLISH AND RETAIN FOR ALL ALLIES THE FREEDOM TO MAKE LIMITED TRANSFERS OF MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER IN BETWEEN PHASES. HOWEVER, SPECIFIC ALLIED NEEDS FOR THAT PERIOD WOULD BE MET BY NEGOTIATING AND ALLOWANCE FOR US/USSR ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REDUCTIONS/LIMITATIONS NEGOTIATED IN PHASE I. ON THE OTHER HAND, ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE AGGREGATE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCES COULD COMPLICATE THE ALLIED APPROACH IN PHASE I, AS DISCUSSED ABOVE AND COULD BLUR, IN ONE ASPECT, THE DESTINCTION BETWEEN PHASES. THE SIMPLE SOLUTION, WHICH WOULD MEET FORESEEN ALLIED MILITARY/TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, WOULD BE TO ARRANGE SPECIFIC ALLOWANCES FOR US/USSR IN PHASE I AND, SIMILARLY, AGGREGATE ALLOWANCES AT THE END OF PHASE II.  
END TEXTSTREATOR

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 NOV 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** greeneet  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO06048  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751189/abbrznab.tel  
**Line Count:** 272  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** USNATO 5985 041850Z NOV 75  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** greeneet  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <17 SEP 2003 by greeneet>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: WORKING GROUP STUDY OF SUB-CEILING ARRANGEMENTS AND FLEXIBILITY  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE PRIORITY  
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA  
BONN  
LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006